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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
Reform and its critics 
Every person who has ever fallen haplessly into some bureaucratic web can 
certainly understand the desire to see state bureaucracy pruned–cut down and 
back, trimmed to the brink of scrawny death–in order for it to grow one day into 
something recognizable, familiar, perhaps even vaguely appealing. The jaded 
among us may sense a futility of effort, but the hope of success brings a fleeting 
glimmer of determination. Such was the setting for President Putin’s executive 
branch reform plan, but that bitter aftertaste? That’s reality setting in. 
 
The reforms themselves presented many questions (many cynical questions) 
about their proposed implementation: In the Kremlin, for instance, would 
Abramov, Ivanov and Shuvalov receive pay cuts to go with their diminished job 
title? Or would they simply change the name plaques on their gilt Kremlin office 
doors? (Hint: No one is facing a pay cut.) 
 
Before the cynicism hardens into misanthropy, it should be noted that the 
foundation of the reforms seems solid enough: Decrease the number of 
ministerial deputies and the departments (sections, directorates, etc.) with 
overlapping spheres of authority to reduce the avenues for corruption (you can’t 
collect a toll on a closed road, at least not for long), and increase the salaries of 
the bureaucrats left standing to reduce the demand for extra-curricular 
remuneration. 
 
To that end, the number of government ministries has been whittled down 
substantially, with a corresponding decrease in the number of deputy prime 
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ministers and ministers in general. (1) A restructuring of the organization of the 
government’s responsibilities has produced a more rational-looking schematic of 
the ministers’ work. An overarching Ministry of Industry and Energy, for example, 
will incorporate Nuclear Oversight, the Space Agency, Construction and Housing, 
Energy, and even the infamous Minatom (now down-sized to federal agency 
status). (2) 
 
As that example may suggest however, the decrease in numbers of ministries 
has been met by an increase in "federal agency" designations. There are now 17 
new federal services and 20 newly created federal agencies. (3) The actual 
relevance of the name changes from Ministry to Agency or Commission to 
Service is, as yet, unclear. (The big toll road may be closed, but you still have to 
pay to walk the path?) The careful grouping of related fields demonstrates the 
months of planning–the Government Commission on Administrative Reform, led 
by Boris Aleshin, has been meeting since last August after all. (4) The headline 
stealing slash of ministerial level workers belies the virtual "full employment" 
policy of the administrative reformers–Kasianov appears to be just about the only 
former government leader left (unwillingly?) by the side of the road. If this weren’t 
a whole new era, with a new tough love president and his reform-minded team, 
one would have to wonder if the shake-up wasn’t a "Yel’tsin special"– specifically 
designed to shake loose a single tenacious minister. 
 
Perhaps even more intriguing is the status of the ‘Big Five’ ministries, thus far left 
out of the reform schemes—-those directly under presidential oversight (and the 
federal services that accompany them). While it has already been made clear 
that the "two deputy" rule need not apply to the power organs, there is constant 
speculation about a possible overhaul of the Security Services and Defense 
Ministry. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has already been undercut by the 
creation of a Foreign Policy Directorate (see below, "Foreign Relations"), which 
will split policy formulation and even implementation responsibilities. 
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Sergei Shoigu’s Emergencies Ministry is protected by the appearance of success 
and perhaps even by a personal presidential debt to Shoigu. The MVD and FSB 
have already been through one round of redistribution among power ministries 
(5), and while another can’t be ruled out, it would seem unlikely for Putin to draw 
even more attention to the workings of the services by publicly reforming them 
again. The Ministry of Justice was an integral part of reformer-Extraordinaire, 
Dmitri Kozak’s previous judicial reform act. The Defense Ministry however, 
appears ripe for a full-on renovation. Early indications can be seen in the further 
consolidation of the arms production and sales industries. 
 
Several federal services have been moved directly into the Ministry of Defense’s 
purview: Special Construction; Military-technical cooperation; Defense Orders; 
and Exports Control all have been remade as Defense Ministry branches. 
Clearly, Sergei Ivanov is attempting to "streamline" the procedures of the arms 
trade by incorporating everything from construction to negotiating terms to export 
expediting in his one-stop shopping Ministry. Few personnel changes have 
accompanied the chain of command alterations: most of the moves have been 
lateral, as in Andrei Belyaninov’s jump from Rosoboroneksport to his new post as 
Head of Defense Orders (technically, Belyaninov’s senior deputy, Sergei 
Chemezov steps up the ladder to take over at Rosoboroneksport). The stability of 
personnel in this instance suggests that Ivanov is pulling the arms industry closer 
in a defensive move, to protect this turf from other contenders, rather than to pry 
it away from overly independent minds. The Foreign Ministry, had it not been 
gutted by administrative reforms, would surely have something to say about 
these moves. The General Staff still might. 
 
Some questions linger as the details of this bureaucratic restructuring become 
more evident. If this radical reform was many months in the planning, why did 
Putin trumpet the dismissal of Kasianov’s government and the announcement of 
a new government structure so close to the presidential elections, rather than just 
releasing the details of his well-thought out scheme? If reform was really the 
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goal, why continue the policy of creating duplicative bodies of authority on major 
topics (but bury them below the ministerial fold)? And finally, if not for reform, 
then what? 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) See previous issues of NIS Observed, 8 Apr 04 and 25 Mar 04. 
(2) Izvestiya, 10 Mar 04; Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. 56, no. 10, 
7 Apr 04. 
(3) Izvestiya, 12 Mar 04; Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. 56, no. 10, 
7 Apr 04. 
(4) Izvestiya, 6 Aug 04; What the Papers Say (WPS) via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
(5) See Perspective, vol. XIV, no. 3 March/April 2004. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Sutyagin verdict "a warning" says FSB 
Igor Sutyagin was first arrested in October 1999, when he was working for the 
USA and Canada Institute in Moscow, and was charged with High Treason. The 
FSB claimed that Sutyagin sold information about Russia’s nuclear submarines 
and missile warning systems to the Central Intelligence Agency, via a British-
owned cover company, called Alternative Futures. (1) 
 
Sutyagin’s case was first heard in the Kaluga Regional Court in 2001. The trial 
ended with a ruling that there was insufficient evidence to convict. Moreover, the 
court stated that the charges against him were so vague, that they "interfered 
with Sutyagin’s right to a defense."(2) Instead of dismissing the case however, 
further investigation was ordered by the court. Meanwhile, Sutyagin was to be 
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kept in detention pending the results. During the summer of 2002, the case was 
transferred from Kaluga to Moscow, a decision which caused consternation 
among Sutyagin’s lawyers, because Moscow courts have gained a reputation for 
"returning guilty verdicts in ‘spy trials’ in which the government has failed to 
provide compelling evidence." (3) Finally, in August last year, the Prosecutor-
General’s office announced that Sutyagin’s case indeed would be returned to the 
Moscow courts. 
 
The initial hearings for his second trial began in September 2003, and the trial 
itself began on March 23 2004. The specific charges against him were that he 
had met with foreign intelligence officers on five occasions, and had passed 
along information on "the MIG-29SMT fighter, plans for Russia’s strategic nuclear 
forces until 2007, permanent readiness units, and the structure and condition of 
Russia’s early warning system."(4) 
 
The trial attracted criticism from the beginning: During the hearings in last winter, 
the composition of the jury was changed without warning. At the same time, the 
 
assigned judge, a "leading jury trial expert" was replaced by an inexperienced 
junior justice. (5) 
 
After an 11 day closed trial, the Judge, Marina Komarova, asked the jury to 
deliberate four questions in deciding whether Sutyagin was guilty as charged, or 
should be acquitted. First, they should consider whether he had been "recruited 
by a foreign intelligence agency;" secondly, they should consider whether he had 
received remuneration for his activities; third, was there enough evidence on the 
previous two questions for a verdict; and finally, the judge asked the jury to 
discuss the question of leniency, based on Sutyagin having already served four 
years in prison. (6) After only three hours of deliberation the 12 member jury 
panel returned a "guilty" verdict on the charge of "state treason in the form of 
espionage." Only four jury members believed that Sutyagin deserved to be 
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treated with leniency. (7) Two days later, the sentencing hearing took place. 
Sutyagin was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment, and the judge stated that the 
sentence should be served out in a prison camp with "a special hard labor 
regime". (8) 
 
Reaction to the verdict has come from many quarters. An FSB spokesman stated 
that "we are pleased with the outcome…This should serve as a warning to 
scientists, ecological organizations, journalists and others who often exchange 
information with foreigners."(9) Another FSB source stated in an interview with 
RIA News Agency that Sutyagin had been fully aware that he was cooperating 
with foreign agencies, and added that "Igor Sutyagin’s case shows that Russian 
society is recovering. Every country has interests that it protects." (10) 
 
Meanwhile, the response to the verdict and sentence from human tights groups 
and the 
 
West as a whole has been one of deep concern. In Washington, State 
Department Deputy Spokesman Adam Ereli stated that the United States could 
not comment in detail, because the trial had been closed. He stated that there 
had been "a general lack of transparency and questions about due process" 
during the trial. The United States, Ereli intimated, had informed the Kremlin of 
these concerns. (11) 
 
Grigori Pasko, a journalist also convicted of treason several years ago, but 
released on parole last year, has commented on the case, arguing that the 
sentence is "payback for all the cases they (the FSB) had lost." (12) Pasko was 
referring to Valentin Danilov, a scientist who was acquitted in December 2003 of 
spying for China. (13) Several other prominent human rights activists have added 
their voices to the argument that Sutyagin’s case constitutes ‘revenge’ for the 
FSB. Maria Lipman of the Moscow Office of the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace stated that the sentence was "a surprise" because it was out 
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of proportion to similar cases. (14) Lev Ponomarev, of the Human Rights Group, 
expressed his fears that the verdict would "change the social climate" of the 
country, returning Russia to the closed atmosphere prevalent under the Soviet 
government. (15) It is clear that the severity of the sentence is indeed, as the 
FSB has stated, designed to serve as a warning, and perhaps as revenge for 
prior failures. But the case may not end here. Sutyagin’s lawyers are pursuing 
two avenues in an attempt to obtain his release. First, Sutyagin’s legal team has 
announces its intention to file an appeal with Russia’s Supreme Court. His 
lawyers allege that Judge Komarova was remiss in not instructing the jury to 
consider Sutyagin’s defense argument; namely the claim that all the information 
he released was already public and declassified. The defense team also alleges 
that the FSB planted several of its agents on the jury in order to guarantee a 
conviction. (16) At the very least, the first of these defense arguments appears to 
hold some water: Sergei Rogov, the Director of the USA and Canada Institute 
has said that Sutyagin could not have passed on "any top secret information. 
What he disclosed were his own conclusions based on information gathered from 
open sources and his personal contacts." (17) Rogov intimated that what 
Sutyagin had done was "not spying" because he had passed little, if any, 
information which could have harmed the state. (18) 
 
Finally, Boris Kuznetsov, Sutyagin’s primary defense attorney, stated that the 
International Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg had accepted a request to 
fast-track a review of Sutyagin’s case. At present, it seems unlikely that these 
appeals will be successful. The trial indicates that the fledgling jury system in 
Russia is merely a façade, and that the Danilov acquittal may well have been an 
anomaly. The FSB seems willing to do anything under the new system to ensure 
that it receives the verdicts it desires. 
 
Source Notes: 
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(1) Action Alert–Russia: "Dr. Sutyagin’s Trial Begins," 26 Sept 03 via 
www.nearinternational.org.  
(2) St. Petersburg Times, 16 Ap 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(3) Action Alert–Russia: "Dr. Sutyagin’s Trial Begins," 26 Sept 03 via 
www.nearinternational.org. 
(4) Izvestiya Press Digest, 6 Apr 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database.  
(5) St. Petersburg Times, 16 Apr 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(6) "Igor Sutyagin hit with 15 year hard labor sentence–FSB says verdict is a 
‘warning;’" Bellona Foundation, 7 Apr 04 via www.bellona.no.  
(7) Ibid. 
(8) Ibid. 
(9) Ibid. 
(10) RIA News Agency Moscow, 9 Apr 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database.  
(11) Agence-France-Presse, 7 Apr 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(12) "Igor Sutyagin hit with 15 year hard labor sentence–FSB says verdict is a 
‘warning;’" Bellona Foundation, 7 Apr 04 via www.bellona.no. 
(13) St. Petersburg Times, 9 Apr 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(14) "Igor Sutyagin hit with 15 year hard labor sentence–FSB says verdict is a 
‘warning;’" Bellona Foundation, 7 Apr 04 via www.bellona.no. 
(15) Agence-France-Presse, 7 Apr 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(16) St. Petersburg Times, 9 Apr 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(17) Ekho Moskvy Radio, 7 Apr 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
(18) Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Scott Dullea 
 
Russia turns off gas to Azerbaijan 
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Was Moscow using an old leverage trick when it halted the supply of natural gas 
to Azerbaijan for three days in mid-April, or was it due simply to "planned repair 
work," as the Azerbaijani Turan news agency has reported? (1) The closing of 
the tap followed recent reports of Moscow’s concern over the rising level of 
military cooperation between Baku and Washington. On 17 April, the Azerbaijani 
daily Ekho reported information that the U.S. was planning to deploy troops to 
Azerbaijan in 2005 or 2006, in part to defend its interests in the Baku-Tblisi-
Ceyhan pipeline, which is scheduled to start pumping crude oil in 2005. (2) 
Additionally, Nezavisimaya gazeta in March quoted the Azerbaijani Defense 
Minister, Safar Abiyev, as saying that a military cooperation venture with the 
U.S., similar to the recently concluded Georgian Train and Equip Program, was 
soon to be announced. (3) 
 
The move to halt energy supplies temporarily to a country in the "near abroad," 
as a means of reminding that state of its energy needs and thereby influencing its 
foreign policy, certainly corresponds to Russia’s historical modus operandi, 
particularly vis-à-vis Azerbaijan’s neighbor, Georgia. While Moscow consistently 
denies there is ongoing competition for influence in the "near abroad," this 
display of pipeline-leverage might serve as an example of what the Kremlin has 
in its arsenal to counter perceived Western encroachment. Azerbaijan is 
especially important to Russia now as the debate over the Caspian Sea's legal 
status proceeds. Should the U.S. gain more influence in Azerbaijan, Russia 
might anticipate losing the position of strength it currently seems to have in the 
Caspian negotiations. (4) 
 
Who’s forming Russian foreign policy? 
In an article on President Putin’s Foreign Policy Directorate, Kommersant 
describes Moscow’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) as occupying merely an 
"auxiliary role" and as being used only for "articulating and implementing the 
presidential line." (5) It asserts that the administration’s Foreign Policy 
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Directorate, under its new leader, Aleksandr Manozhin, actually forms Russian 
foreign policy for the presidential administration. 
 
Manozhin, who is reportedly a senior KGB veteran and has been working until 
now as first deputy head of the Foreign Policy Directorate, is among the many 
siloviki appointed to the highest levels of the presidential apparatus over the past 
several years. (6) 
 
The report also claims that the MFA has always played an insignificant role in the 
formation of foreign policy — even under President Boris Yel'tsin, although it 
specifically excludes the period when Yevgeni Primakov served as Foreign, and 
then Prime Minister. 
 
While the author's characterization of Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov as simply a 
mouthpiece for the president’s foreign policy may appear somewhat overstated, 
there is no denying that Putin likes to keep his hands firmly on the controls of 
Moscow’s international affairs. His summit-to-summit foreign policy style and 
frequent use of special presidential envoys bear witness to this practice. 
Moreover, his use of the Foreign Policy Directorate, rather than the MFA, to 
shape his foreign policy, further demonstrates his efforts to centralize the 
Russian government and concentrate power in the Kremlin. 
 
Latvia expels Russian diplomat for "spying on NATO" 
As the ongoing sparring continues between Riga and Moscow over Latvia’s plans 
to limit teaching in Russian at secondary schools for minorities, the Russian MFA 
has warned Latvia to refrain from taking "unfriendly steps." The Ministry’s 
statement also criticized the Latvian government, stating that "[It] continues to 
live in the world of stereotypes of the Cold War era." (7) 
 
Days later, Latvian Foreign Minister Rihards Piks, apparently feeling less 
insecure as a new member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
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predicted that although Russian-Latvian political relations would improve, it would 
not happen overnight. He stated that Moscow will have to "get accustomed to the 
new geopolitical situation and our country's new status." (8) In the same 
interview, Piks confirmed that Latvia will sign the Treaty on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe (CFE) after its current signatories have ratified the agreement 
— thus leaving Riga’s accession to the treaty an open question, given the 
hesitance of other signatories. Moreover, Piks connected the Treaty's 
effectiveness in ensuring European stability with Moscow’s obligation to remove 
its forces from Georgia and Moldova. 
 
On 23 April, the Latvian government expelled a Russian diplomat for showing too 
much interest in NATO’s Latvian infrastructure. The Russian MFA immediately 
linked that action to Latvia’s alleged lack of independent decision-making 
capability and pressure from Riga’s new NATO allies. It also connected the move 
to the "anti-Russian policy of [Latvia's] current leadership… [and its] Russophobic 
politicians." (9) 
 
This expulsion of a Russian diplomat is the sixth from the Baltic countries this 
year — but the first from Latvia. The expulsions have been part of rising tensions 
between the Baltic states and Moscow over the past few months, as the 
European Union’s (E.U.) and NATO’s expansion approached. While Moscow 
ratchets up the rhetoric against the Baltic countries’ treatment of their Russian 
minorities, it is working simultaneously with the E.U. to put additional pressure on 
Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius. 
 
Of the 14 "issues of concern" that Moscow presented to the E.U. in February 04, 
it now says that only three remain unresolved. One is the question of the 
Russian-speaking minority in the Baltic countries. (10) Should this issue remain 
in limbo after the E.U.’s May 04 enlargement, it is likely that friction between 
Moscow and its Baltic neighbors will continue on a bilateral basis (in the manner 
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seen now) potentially hampering both E.U.-Russian and NATO-Russian 
relations. 
 
Lavrov caught smoking…again 
During his recent trip to Ireland to discuss Russian-E.U. relations with the E.U.’s 
leading "troika," Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was, as he himself told 
journalists, nearly issued a €3,000 fine for smoking in a Dublin restaurant. (11) 
This is not the first time Lavrov has been cited as a result of lighting up in 
violation of anti-smoking rules. In September 03, then Russian Ambassador to 
the United Nations Lavrov expressed his frustration over U.N. Secretary General 
Kofi Annan’s restrictions on smoking inside U.N. headquarters. Calling the 
Secretary General merely a "hired manager" without the authority to impose such 
a ban, he said Annan was just trying to "please [New York City] Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg."(12) 
 
On the one hand, it seems somewhat unbecoming for the foreign minister of one 
of the world’s most powerful countries to be caught up in such a trivial issue as 
smokers’ rights. On the other hand, charged with the responsibility of conducting 
the foreign affairs of the heir to the Soviet Union, who wouldn’t be driven to 
smoke? 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Turan, 21 Apr 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database 
(2) Ekho, 17 Apr 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database 
(3) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 23 Mar 04; FBIS Report, 26 Mar 04 via World News 
Connection. 
(4) Izvestiya, 14 Apr 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(5) Kommersant, 19 Apr 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
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(6) Laurent Murawiec and Clifford C. Gaddy, "The Higher Police: Vladimir Putin 
and His Predecessors," The National Interest, online weekly, Issue Date: Spring 
2002, Posted On: 1/21/2003, http://www.nationalinterest.org. 
(7) Radio Russia, 12 Apr 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
(8) Vesti Segodnya, 14 Apr 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
(9) Radio Russia, 23 Apr 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
(10) RIA Novosti, 14 Apr 04 via Johnson’s Russia List #8167, 14 Apr 04. 
(11) Ekho Moskvy, 14 Apr 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
(12) BBC News World Edition Online, 9 Sep 03, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/ 3094498.stm. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Kate Martin 
 
LEGISLATURE 
MPs learn to read 
Apparently surprised at the wording of a proposed bill that they had passed in the 
first reading, members of Russia’s lower house of parliament decided that 
perhaps they didn’t want to restrict citizens’ right to assemble and protest after 
all. The bill, proposed by Deputy Justice Minister Yevgeni Sidorenko and passed 
by United Russia’s overwhelming majority on 31 March, (1) garnered increasingly 
vocal protests from members of the opposition and, eventually, from the 
President and United Russia’s leadership. The day after the first reading, MP 
Pavel Krasheninnikov, who heads the Duma committee on civil, criminal, 
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arbitration and procedural legislation, announced the removal of the ban on 
rallies near government offices from the draft. (2) Within days the United Russia 
deputies had admitted the list of off-limits areas for protests may have been 
passed without sufficient review. (3) 
 
So, what’s going on in Moscow? Is there a rogue MP element working against 
the wishes and direction of the President and party leadership? Are deputies, 
made over-confident by the number of seats held, simply approving everything 
that comes their way, without reading the bills? Or, more likely, are restrictive 
laws being proposed in order to gauge public reaction? 
 
First Deputy Speaker Lyubov Sliska gave some indication of the latter when 
discussing the improvements expected of the legislation for the second reading, 
which now appears to be scheduled for May. "The conceptual framework, which 
we adopted recently, was a sort of a test," she said. "Anyway, the procedure for 
holding rallies was to be streamlined on the level of legislation." (4) 
 
Okay, so it was a test. But was it given with the President’s knowledge? That is 
more difficult to say. Putin waited a while before weighing in, but warned Speaker 
Boris Gryzlov more than two weeks after the bill’s first reading to be wary of 
encroaching on citizens’ rights. "There must be order; the law should not lead to 
the restrictions on citizens’ freedoms. This is an obvious fact, and I am hoping 
the MPs will proceed from that," he said. (5) And that, as they say, will be that. 
 
But wait: Apparently just to prove that the Duma does understand the democratic 
process, Deputy Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin announced that the second 
reading of the draft law should be as public as possible, with the authors on hand 
to answer questions from deputies. "We would like to hear how the authors 
intend to resolve a number of disputable questions that have started a public 
discussion," he said. (6) And it would be far too cynical to suppose that the 
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deputies who blithely passed the original draft law would use the opportunity to 
pose as champions of democracy in the process  
 
Breakdown of powers provides view of who’s who, and who isn’t 
The Duma leadership finally got around to divvying up responsibilities among the 
deputy speakers this month, giving a clear indication of who is trusted within the 
party of power. 
 
Speaker Boris Gryzlov (United Russia) is in charge of the Duma’s committees on 
defense, international relations and security. First Deputy Speaker Lyubov Sliska 
may have the title, but Deputy Speaker Oleg Morozov landed the responsibilities 
that were up for grabs after the elimination of the second deputy speaker post. 
Morozov will be in charge of Duma interaction with the government (and also with 
the regions) concerning legislative activity and commission work. Vladimir 
Pekhtin (United Russia), will serve as the Duma’s link to the presidential staff. 
 
Vyacheslav Volodin (United Russia) will coordinate the work of the Duma’s 
budget committee, as well as factional and committee activity concerning the 
budget. Georgi Boos (United Russia) will serve as liaison with the World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. 
 
Sergei Baburin, of the Rodina (Motherland) party, has been put in charge of 
Duma interaction with the government organs in the Urals Federal District. 
Valentin Kuptsov (KPRF) and Vladimir Katrenko (United Russia) will have similar 
responsibilities with organs in the Siberian Federal District and the Southern 
Federal District, respectively. However, Kuptsov also will cooperate with 
international trade unions and MPs in China, Cuba, Eastern Europe, Moldova 
and Vietnam. Katrenko will also lead the Duma’s economic policy committee and 
the women’s, family and children’s affairs committee, and collaborate with the 
United Nations organs focusing on economic cooperation. 
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And, not without irony, Vladimir Zhirinovsky (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia) 
will be in charge of coordinating international humanitarian cooperation activity. 
(7) No mention was made of the tasks assigned to the final deputy speaker, Artur 
Chilingarov, who recently returned from leading a mission to rescue a Russian 
expedition to the Arctic. (8) 
 
MEDIA 
Ministries volley for power over press 
One of the more interesting debates being played out in public these days is who 
will be in charge of the mass media, following the disintegration of the Press 
Ministry. Aleksandr Sokolov, Minister of Culture and Mass Communications, 
announced on 7 April how he saw the power delineation emerging. The ministry, 
Sokolov said, would oversee legislative and political functions regarding the 
media, while government agencies would be in charge of economic and 
organizational functions. Or, the ministry would do the thinking, while the 
agencies would put those thoughts into actions. At issue in the real world is who 
will be in charge of issuing licenses. And, after all the talk of changes, the answer 
comes down to "the same people, in the same offices, with the same phones, at 
the same desks," according to Leonid Nadirov, First Deputy Minister of Culture 
and Mass Communication overseeing the mass media. But maybe not. Mikhail 
Seslavinsky, the newly named head of the Federal Agency for the Press and 
Mass Communication, said that the administration dealing with registration and 
licensing will be split up, at least somewhat. "Part will go to the Ministry of 
Justice, but we hope that the backbone of the licensing administration will go to 
the Ministry of Culture," he said. (9) 
 
And yet, within weeks, jurisdiction was shifting yet again. Seslavinsky announced 
in Kaliningrad that the Culture Ministry would be in charge of media licensing for 
the time being, until a special service is created, in the near future, to oversee 
both licensing and compliance. (10) 
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POLITICAL PARTIES 
Parties are burstin’ out all over 
In what is beginning to be a near-constant phenomenon, new parties have 
emerged in the past few weeks, filling in what some see as a vacuum of power 
beyond United Russia. Alas, some party organizers may be a bit more 
enthusiastic about their groups’ future, and present, than others. 
 
Independent deputies Vladimir Ryzhkov and Mikhail Zadornov announced the 
establishment of the Democratic Alternative Club on 15 April, and provided a list 
of liberal politicians who have signed on as members–or maybe not. Mikhail 
Margelov, chairman of the Federation Council’s international committee and a 
member of United Russia, denied reports that he was affiliated with the Club. "I 
have found my name on the list of club members, but I know nothing about the 
nature and goals of the club," Margelov said. The club, which purportedly will act 
as a debate forum for new ideas and to search for possible leaders of a new 
liberal party, has listed as members YABLOKO’s Aleksei Arbatov, Sergei Popov 
and Galina Khovanskaya; Leonid Gozman, Boris Nadezhdin and Ivan Starikov, 
from the Union of Right Forces (SPS); Viktor Pokhmelkin, leader of Automobile 
Russia; Republican Vladimir Lysenko; and, from United Russia, Valeri Galchenko 
and Mikhail Yemelyanov. (11) 
 
It does appear that the Democratic Alternative Club’s goals mirror those of 
another group recently founded with the same level of fanfare, 2008: Free 
Choice. Some of the latter’s members are worried that parties at the democratic 
end of the spectrum will once more undergo a battle for power that will split 
support, as had been seen for years with the inability of YABLOKO and SPS to 
join forces. Viktor Shenderovich and Yuliya Latynina, for example, both 
expressed concern that no single leader is emerging, while numerous small 
parties are founded. Others, however, such as Nadezhdin, who belongs to both 
groups, applaud the chance to debate and elaborate an agenda. (12) 
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At the opposite end of the political spectrum, parties also are being created, but 
there is no lack of leadership. Rather, the parties are being formed as 
foundations to challenge Gennadi Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party of 
the Russian Federation (KPRF). As discussed previously, Zyuganov had been 
battling competition in the Patriotic Union, namely Gennadi Semigin. (13) Now 
Zyuganov has a new force with which to contend: Dmitri Rogozin, fresh from his 
victory of getting Rodina (Motherland) faction co-founder Sergei Glazyev 
drummed out of a leadership position there. (14) Rogozin has announced his 
plans to turn his Rodina faction into a replacement for the KPRF in the minds of 
the electorate. Rogozin claimed that the KPRF has ceased to act as an 
opposition party, and instead is acting as a parasite in the political process. 
There is a need, he asserts, for a strong party to fill the social-liberal vacuum. 
(15) 
 
Meanwhile, Rogozin is busy collecting allies. He has approached the People’s 
Party to suggest that the two groups merge into one party, since they already 
share social democratic ideas and already are allied. According to Rogozin, 
there’s no time to lose. "If we plan to merge or integrate, better do it earlier and 
not lose time," he said. Newly elected People’s Party leader Gennadi Gudkov, 
(16) has announced a plan to create a coalition that would include the Rodina 
faction, but said the party is not planning to cut its ties with United Russia just 
yet. (17) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) The NIS Observed, 7 Apr 04. 
(2) ITAR-TASS, 1611 GMT, 1 Apr 04 via World News Connection. 
(3) Vremya novostei, 5 Apr 04 via World News Connection. 
(4) ITAR-TASS, 1227 GMT, 15 Apr 04 via World News Connection. 
(5) ITAR-TASS, 1505 GMT, 15 Apr 04 via World News Connection. 
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(6) ITAR-TASS, 1744 GMT, 19 Apr 04 via World News Connection. 
(7) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 Apr 04 via World News Connection. 
(8) ITAR-TASS, 2233 GMT, 6 Mar 04 via World News Connection. 
(9) Rossiyskaya gazeta, 7 Apr 04 via World News Connection. 
(10) ITAR-TASS, 1337 GMT, 21 Apr 04 via World News Connection. 
(11) ITAR-TASS, 1918 GMT, 16 Apr 04 via World News Connection. 
(12) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 16 Apr 04 via World News Connection. 
(13) The NIS Observed, 24 Mar 04. 
(14) Izvestiya, 5 Mar 04 via World News Connection. 
(15) Izvestiya, 13 Apr 04 via World News Connection. 
(16) ITAR-TASS, 1356 GMT, 17 Apr 04 via World News Connection. 
(17) ITAR-TASS, 1520 GMT, 17 Apr 04 via World News Connection. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Paul Lyons 
 
NAVY 
To be or not to be…that is the Iraqi question 
The run-up to war in Iraq tested the fabric of both regional and international 
alliances around the world. Equally, it tested the leadership and the resolve of 
many states in confronting the problematic realities posed by the tyrannical and 
terrorist-laden initiatives of our world’s malcontents. To some, the courageous, 
that meant supporting the U.S.-led coalition. In large part, that meant knowing 
that the challenge of ridding the world, once and for all, of despotic regimes was 
worth both the effort and price required. Russia now, as before the war, has 
failed to extend the resources and/or personnel to participate in this epic battle. 
Moreover, Russia is now trying to fight the rhetorical fight instead, by telling those 
nations that have forces in Iraq, to get out. 
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Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s visit to Ukraine recently entailed 
discussions on Ukraine’s economic interests with Russia, on the Sea of 
Azov/Kerch Strait demarcation and, most notably, on Ukraine’s support for the 
U.S.-led coalition in Iraq. 
 
Lavrov met with President Kuchma and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Grischenko. 
With perhaps the ripple effects of NATO expansion and the gravitational pull of 
the West continuing to draw alliances from the "Near Abroad," it's plausible that 
President Putin dispatched Lavrov in a vain attempt to discourage Ukraine’s 
westward tack. Nezavisimaya gazeta commented on Lavrov’s visit, "the situation 
being what it is, an official representative of Moscow, which has always been 
against the American operation in Iraq, could persuade Kiev to renege on [its] 
promises to Washington." (1) 
 
Yet, with much of the world’s attention (and media coverage) focused on the 
nations that have refused to embark upon the noble journey to rid the world of 
terrorism, many countries, including several members of the CIS, have opted to 
pitch their camp with the U.S.-led coalition. In fact, "Ukraine (1,600 soldiers and 
officers), Azerbaijan (over 150 servicemen), Georgia (210 servicemen), 
Kazakhstan (30 servicemen) and Moldavia (30 servicemen) are among the more 
zealous supporters of the U.S. policy in Iraq." (2) 
 
Kazakhstan 
While Russia attempts to steer Ukraine out of Iraq, many CIS countries are 
planning to stay the course. In fact, Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister, 
Kasymzhomart Tokayev stated recently that "Kazakhstan has no plans of pulling 
its military contingent out of Iraq in the short-term." (3) The 30-odd Kazakh 
servicemen are tasked predominantly with mine-clearing operations and 
searching for munition stockpiles within Iraq. Their mission as representatives of 
a predominantly Moslem country is fundamental to the overarching scheme of 
attaining and promoting a peaceful democracy within Iraq. That goal doesn’t 
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seem lost on Tokayev. He recently pledged that "Kazakhstan took an obligation 
to send a contingent to Iraq, and we must live up to that obligation." (4) 
 
Ukraine 
Defying attempts by Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to convince 
Ukrainian President Kuchma to extract his forces from Iraq, Ukraine, like 
Kazakhstan, will complete its obligations to the U.S.-led coalition. According to 
ITAR TASS, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma intends to stay in Iraq, saying 
that "Kiev would not beef up its military contingent in Iraq, after several countries 
withdrew their servicemen from that country–[but] emphasizing that the Ukrainian 
peacekeepers intend to perform their duty in Iraq to the end." (5) Opposition to 
President Kuchma’s resolve isn’t limited to Russia. Domestically, the divide over 
Ukrainian troop deployments to Iraq is fueled most demonstrably by the 
Communists, who are stoutly against a Ukrainian presence in Iraq. The political 
row that has developed has led the parliament to propose a bill recalling the 
Ukrainian contingent from Iraq. With elections approaching, President Kuchma 
remains steadfast: "Ukraine is present in Iraq for peace-keeping purposes. We 
are not conquerors or a force of occupation. We shall comply with our duty. We 
shall not flee." (6) 
 
Georgia 
Contrary to the course that Spain has chosen to steer out of Iraq, Georgia is 
augmenting its role with the U.S.-led coalition and bolstering its military 
contingent (present since August 2003) by sending 159 servicemen to Iraq on 
April 7. The force structure is primarily comprised of soldiers of the 16th Infantry 
Battalion who were trained by the U.S. in 2003. Georgia aspires to strengthen its 
contingent to 210 troops. 
 
Azerbaijan and Moldova 
In a military decision consistent with those of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Georgia, 
Azerbaijan has opted to stay committed to the coalition forces in Iraq. Araz 
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Azimov, Deputy Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan, stated in late March that 
"Azerbaijani servicemen will remain in Iraq while this suits Azerbaijan's national 
interests, and [and added that] Azerbaijani society does not have differences 
regarding Azerbaijan's cooperation with NATO and the U.S." (7) 
 
Equally, the Moldovan parliament recently approved a referendum on whether or 
not to prolong the mission of Moldovan servicemen in Iraq. The vote authorizes a 
group of 12 Moldovan military engineers to continue to assist with reconstruction 
efforts within Iraq. 
 
As NATO expansion spreads to Russia's borders, it is becoming apparent that 
Russia's sphere of influence within the CIS is waning. The rapid accession of 
former Soviet countries and satellite states to the E.U. and NATO has prompted 
Russia to try to dissuade others from deeper integration with European 
institutions. Russia's message seems to fall on deaf ears in Poland, Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan and the like, who see alliance with the West and support for Iraq as 
mutually beneficial foundations for understanding and cooperation. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 Apr 04; What the Paper’s Say via ISI (Defense and 
Security) Emerging Markets Database. 
(2) What the Paper’s Say Observer 12 Apr 04 via ISI (Defense and Security) 
Emerging Markets Database. 
(3) ITAR-TASS, 22 Apr 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0422 via World News Connection. 
(4) ITAR-TASS, 22 Apr04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0422 via World News Connection. 
(5) ITAR-TASS, 22 Apr 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0422 via World News Connection. 
(6) ITAR-TASS, 22 Apr 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0422 via World News Connection. 
(7) What the Paper’s Say Observer 12 Apr 04 via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Elena Selyuk 
 
What will change for western CIS after E.U. enlargement? 
Ten Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) will join the European 
Union this Saturday - a joyful and long anticipated event for them, but a rather 
sorrowful one for those who are left behind. Two of them - Ukraine and Belarus 
will directly border the E.U. starting 1 May. What will change for these countries 
on this day? Will the changes be negative or positive? How "transparent" will the 
falling "curtain" be? 
 
Ukraine 
Ukraine felt gradual isolation creeping in with the introduction of visa regimes 
with Slovakia, Hungary and Poland long before the actual CEEC's accession to 
the E.U.. Those who suffered most were not criminals (who always find their way 
in), but ordinary citizens, who, due to high unemployment in Ukraine, were 
working both illegally and legally in these countries. Visas are prohibitively 
expensive and often require long waiting periods; those involved in small cross-
border trade and those with relatives in new member countries suffer 
disproportionately. To exemplify the point, in the first three months after visas 
were introduced between Ukraine and Slovakia in June 2000, the number of 
Ukrainian tourists visiting Slovakia fell by 76%, private trips fell by 57%, and 
business trips fell by 64%. (1) The high cost of freedom of movement was 
especially painful for Ukrainians, as, psychologically, it constituted the return to 
times of isolation after a decade of openness. 
 
More changes, primarily economic, are due for Ukraine by May. First, since 
Ukraine has a free-trade agreements with the Baltic states, they will become void 
once these states join the single market and will be subjected completely to E.U. 
economic policies. (2) Second, in the next several years, after new members' 
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accession to E.U., trade between these countries and Ukraine may fall by as 
much as 25% (or about $618 m). Ukraine's exports to new accession countries 
comprises about 13-15% of the country's total exports, thus resulting potentially 
in a substantial loss of revenues. (3) European Union officials, when asked about 
possible compensation for Ukraine's lost trade, stated that Ukraine should benefit 
overall from E.U. enlargement, as the nominal import tariffs of the accession 
countries will fall from 9% to 4%. The reduction of tariffs is not particularly useful 
to Ukraine, however, as the major part of the trade reduction will come from non-
tariff restrictions. For example, what difference will the tariff rate for agricultural 
products make to Ukraine, if these products will not have any chance of landing 
on the European market due to high certification requirements? How will the 
output of the Ukrainian chemical industry be sold inside the Union, given the 
antidumping restrictions that obtain in the E.U.? (4) In addition, some of the 
ongoing projects between Ukraine and accession countries may be in jeopardy. 
For example, carrying out the Burshtyn "energy island" project is already facing 
problems due to the rise of domestic coal prices in Poland because of a cut in 
government subsidies. (5) Other consequences, harder to quantify, will certainly 
appear or, in many cases, intensify. 
 
Despite numerous negative consequences, many argue that the overall long-
term impact of the E.U. enlargement on Ukraine will be positive. Eventually, after 
modernizing sufficiently to comply with E.U. trade and sanitary regulations, 
Ukraine will have access to a much larger consumer market, which can lead to 
increased trade and revenues. In addition, being in such a close proximity to the 
European Union, could potentially encourage Ukrainian politicians to undertake 
more reforms in the hope of joining the E.U. one day. This prospect is not very 
likely, however, given that the E.U. is not dangling many "carrots" for Ukraine and 
without external pressure, encouragement, and control, the reformation process 
may be extremely slow. 
 
Belarus 
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As the European Union is preparing to enlarge, Belarus is pointedly isolated. 
Lukashenko is doing everything possible to preserve and even expand to the old 
Soviet culture by introducing mandatory ideological teaching in schools and at 
work places, preserving the state of inefficiency in the economy and suppressing 
the emergence of civil society. 
 
Due, in large part, to the regime, Belarus' losses from E.U. enlargement may be 
somewhat smaller than the Ukraine's, but still substantial. Belarus, for example, 
does not have a free-trade zone with the Baltic countries, but only preferential 
trade tariffs, which are easier to give up. Due to the very nature of the 
Belarussian economy (distorted production structure, absence of natural 
employment structure, absence of wide scale privatization), the country is not 
well suited to compete in a market environment. And even though almost 13% of 
Belarussian exports go to the countries that are about to join the E.U., this 
percentage may go down, as direct foreign investment into new E.U. members 
(especially the Baltics) is likely to increase and, consequently, boost these 
countries' capabilities to develop new products more efficiently, thus jeopardizing 
Belarussian exports. 
 
Just as in the case of Ukraine, E.U. product requirements can pose a 
considerable barrier to Belarus-E.U. trade relations. Already now, Belarussian 
beauty product manufacturers are not able to export their output to E.U. states 
since they failed to follow all the required procedures. Other restrictions such as 
textile quotas, antidumping duties, standardization and certification of goods for 
the European market, etc. will further complicate E.U.-Belarus trade relations. In 
addition, instead of benefiting from new members complying with the E.U. legal 
and institutional framework (which simplifies trade procedures), the cost of doing 
business with these countries may increase for Belarus, since it does not have 
well-developed institutions, well-trained state officials or a functional business 
environment. (6) 
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The Belarus Foreign Ministry managed to alleviate some of the negative 
consequences of E.U. enlargement, such as an agreement on antidumping 
duties on potash fertilizers and a possibility for Belarus textiles imported before 1 
May 2004 to be distributed "freely, without quotas" on the whole E.U. territory 
after its expansion. (7) The Belarussian government hopes that after E.U. 
expansion, Belarussian trade with the E.U. will be as high as 35% of Belarus' 
total exports and will increase by $200 million a year from 2005. (8) These hopes 
are likely to materialize only in the long run, however, and only given that Belarus 
goes through substantial economic reforms. 
 
As for the political impact of E.U. enlargement on Belarus, the close proximity to 
the E.U. can potentially change the political atmosphere in the country and 
provide more support to European-oriented politicians. It might even prevent 
Lukashenko from changing the constitution in order to allow him to be re-elected 
for a third term. This scenario has little chance of materializing, given 
Lukashenko's low popularity rating and the unwillingness of the population to go 
through painful market reforms. 
 
The fact that some kind of "curtain" is falling, and both Ukraine and Belarus are 
being sealed off from the expanded Europe, is undeniable. This curtain is best 
described as "paper" rather than "iron"—-it is not as thick and impenetrable as 
that of the Cold War. Nonetheless, it has the power to discourage the population 
(of at least Ukraine) from supporting market and democratic transitions and can 
heighten people's sense of despair and hopelessness. On the other hand, close 
proximity to the European Union may also have the opposite effect and assure 
the population of the possibility of joining the "club" one day. The outlook is pretty 
gloomy for now, however. Some say it might take anywhere from 20 to 50 years 
for the western CIS to join the E.U. It is to be hoped that the E.U. will still exist at 
that time. 
 
Moldova (Gagauzia) 
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Mikhail Formuzal, the leader of the United Gagauzia opposition party and Mayor 
of Ciadir-Lunga has accused the Moldovan communist government of trying to 
intimidate him, eliminate his party in the region in order to secure a communist 
victory in 2005 parliamentary elections, and of attempts to liquidate Gagauz 
autonomy. On 13 April 2004, Formuzal was dragged to the police commissariat 
in Comrat (capital of Gagauzia) to testify as a witness in a (probably fabricated) 
criminal case. (9) Formuzal described the police actions as attempts to intimidate 
him and silence his criticism of the authorities. "Their single goal is to 'cleanse' 
the land for the Communist Party before…the elections. That's all! The 
authorities want to destroy every anti-Communist movement in the region," said 
Formusal. (10) United Gagauzia does not appear to be in opposition to any other 
Ukrainian party and the movement never declared its opposition to current 
authorities. The purpose of the movement is to help current Gagauz authorities to 
improve the population's standards of living and creating conditions for economic 
growth. (11) 
 
Lately, there has been a lot of pressure on those attempting to speak out against 
communist government in the region. The mayor of Comrat, Constantin Tausanji, 
was dismissed in late March by a local parliament because of his alleged 
mismanagement of municipal funds and of violating existing legislation. (12) The 
ex-mayor believes that this decision was politically motivated. 
 
The administrative territorial unit of Gagauzia in southern Moldova is populated 
by a Turkish-speaking Christian minority whose Muslim ancestors fled the 
Russo-Turkish wars in the 18th century. Those who settled in Gagauzia had to 
convert to Christianity. Their language, a Turkish dialect, has become largely 
"russified," and it has not been subjected to the Islamic influences of other 
Turkish dialects. (13) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
 28 
(1) "E.U. Enlarged, Schengen Implemented - What next? - Political Perspectives 
for Ukraine" via www.isp.org.pl. 
(2) Astrov, Vasili "Ukraine: Parliamentary Crisis Against the Background of 
Strong Economic Performance." A part of WIIW report "Transition Countries on 
the Eve of E.U. Enlargement," 12 Feb 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
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(10) Ibid. 
(11) Infotag news agency, 21 Apr 04; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(12) Basapress news agency, 13 Apr 04; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Ariela Shapiro 
 
Azerbaijan 
Azerbaijan and Turkey solidify Nagorno-Karabakh approach 
Azerbaijani and Turkish officials have jointly endorsed a "gradual approach" (1) 
on a negotiated settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The announcement 
came during Azeri President Ilham Aliev's 13-15 April visit to Ankara, (2) and 
indicates a relaxation of tensions between Baku and Ankara. Turkey has always 
been one of Azerbaijan’s staunchest international supporters in the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, but since early 2004 Ankara had strained bilateral ties by 
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publicly contemplating reopening the Turkish-Armenian border. Ankara’s 
gestures to Yerevan, (3) meant to satisfy U.S. and E.U. pressures to ameliorate 
the hostile Ankara-Yerevan relationship, generated alarm in Azerbaijani 
politicians. President Aliyev went as far as hinging a peaceful resolution of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on Turkey’s firmness in maintaining the Armenian 
border blockade. (4) Since Azerbaijan desires an isolated and landlocked 
Armenia, Aliyev is determined to keep relations between Ankara and Yerevan 
cold. He has succeeded, for the present, as Turkish leaders have announced 
that sanctions against Armenia would not be lifted unless Armenia withdraws 
from at least part of the territory it occupied in and around Nagorno-Karabakh. (5) 
Ankara and Baku have latched onto a proposal, tabled in 1997 by the OSCE’s 
Minsk Group, stipulating a "phased" Armenian withdrawal of its forces from 5 of 7 
occupied regions, followed by Azerbaijan lifting part of its sanctions and resuming 
of railway traffic with Armenia. (6) The implementation and success of this 
"phased" approach in solving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are in doubt since 
Armenia, and, by extension, Russia, do not support the plan, while the Turkish 
position could change depending on the amount of pressure the E.U. exerts 
during upcoming E.U. membership meetings. 
 
Ingushetia 
Chechen quagmire to become Chechen-Ingush conflict? 
According to a 19 April Nezavisimaya gazeta article, (7) an effort to merge 
Chechnya and Ingushetia into one administrative area is being promoted, which 
would ensure Ingushetia becoming "another front line" in the war in Chechnya. 
 
Both Viktor Kazantsev, the former presidential envoy to the South Russian 
Federal District, and pro-Moscow Chechen President Ahmed Kadyrov support 
the merger. Kazantsev, who was envoy until a month ago, wrote a memorandum 
to President Putin dated 7 Nov. 2001, (reproduced on ingushetiya.ru’s website) 
claiming that Ingushetia harbors widespread separatist sentiments as well as 
about 20,000 members of illegal armed formations, including some from 
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Chechnya. (8) In order to quash the danger of separatism, Kazantsev proposed 
that Putin back then FSB General Murat Zyazikov in the April 2002 Ingush 
presidential election, create a commission to draft legislation on the restoration of 
the former Chechen-Ingush Republic, and order the general staff to prepare a 
plan to expand military operations from Chechnya to Ingushetia. According to the 
memo, Kazantsev predicted that those measures would stabilize (and conclude 
the "counterterrorist operations" in) Chechnya by 2002-2003, thus enabling Putin 
to take credit for the "normalization" of the Chechen situation prior to the March 
2004 Russian presidential election. 
 
Zyazikov was duly elected Ingush president, but has continually rejected a 
merging of Ingushetia and Chechnya. (9) The merger probably would cost 
Zyazikov his position as Ingush president, if Moscow chose to elevate Kadyrov to 
the new post. An April 6 assassination attempt on Zyazikov (10) highlighted the 
instability of the region. Moscow may be entangled in yet another Northern 
Caucasus quagmire since Ingushetia is neither stable nor secure, and is led by a 
president whom Moscow would rather see deceased then in control. 
 
At the same time, the assassination attempt provides an opening for Moscow to 
extend Russian forces into Ingushetia. As yet, Russia has not done so, despite 
the incursion of Chechen fighters into Ingushetia during autumn of 2002 (11), the 
ongoing disappearances of Ingush oppositionists, and the killings of civilians by 
police. (12) Russia’s hesitation, thus far, is linked clearly to the wish to avoid 
international blame for heightening violence in the North Caucasus, but may well 
evaporate in light of a 15 April U.N. vote. On that date, the U.N. Commission for 
Human Rights failed, in a vote of 12 in favor and 23 against, to endorse an E.U. 
draft resolution calling on the Russian leadership to take more "resolute actions" 
to halt reprisals by Russian forces against Chechen civilians. (13) By failing to 
pass the resolution, the international community in effect gave Russia a "green 
light" to continue its offensive campaign in Chechnya, as long as that may be 
viewed as falling within the confines of "battling international terrorism." Given 
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such international reassurance, Putin may decide to expand hostilities into 
Ingushetia under that pretext, perhaps to gratify more hawkish elements within 
the Russian military establishment. 
 
Moscow is already planning the logistics for the implementation of a newly 
merged Chechen-Ingush republic, as demonstrated by the creation of the Civic 
Forum in Chechnya. (14) According to Abdul-Khakim Sultygov, Putin’s former 
Commissioner for Human Rights in Chechnya, one of the primary tasks of the 
newly-created Forum is to conduct a public "expert evaluation" on the unification 
of the Chechens and Ingush. (15) The creation of a Chechen-Ingush republic 
would necessitate increasing the levels of Russian military forces in Ingushetia 
and Chechnya and keeping them there indefinitely to maintain order and combat 
the Chechen, and potential Ingush, rebels. 
 
Source Notes: 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By David Montgomery 
 
After the Uzbekistan Bombings: The Reaffirmation of Authoritarianism 
There has been relative calm in the region since the 28 March - 1 April bombings 
in Uzbekistan claimed nearly 50 lives. (1) The concerns of the Central Asian 
governments have started to focus again on regional agreements over trade, the 
exploitation of energy reserves, and, of course, cooperation over shared security 
interests. The immediate impact of the bombings, and steps taken to prevent 
further attacks, is to establish the tone for increased government control in 
Uzbekistan. Uzbek President Islam Karimov expressed his staunch 
determination to uproot terrorism and called on his population to unite "like a fist" 
against the terrorists. (2) The attacks have emboldened the authoritarian aspects 
of the Karimov government which has both limited its openness to democratic 
initiatives and found strong international support in its fight against terrorism. 
 
As the attacks began, Uzbek authorities were quick to implicate international 
terrorists, claiming specifically Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) and the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU) as being the groups most likely to be behind the attacks. 
Officials from HT denied involvement in the attacks as Uzbek security forces 
detained over 400 suspects and kept over 50 in prison. (3) Those arrested came 
from the pool of usual suspects - conservative Muslims believed to have 
ideological ties with HT and the IMU. 
 
Kyrgyz Ombudsman Tursunbay Bakir uulu disagreed with Uzbek accusations of 
HT involvement in the bombings, saying that he had recently met with HT 
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representatives and was sufficiently convinced that such actions were against the 
organization’s ideological agenda. (4) Drawing from the interrogations of 
suspects detained in connection with the attacks however, Uzbek Prosecutor-
General Rashid Qodirov suggested that jamoats (associations akin to "primary 
cells") of HT were the organizational force behind the March bombings. (5) 
Qodirov added that "[the militants’] subversive actions were based on the 
propaganda of members of the Islamic Movement of Turkestan [another name 
for the IMU]… [who] received instruction and underwent military training at 
camps with Arab instructors. At the same time, al-Qa’ida fighters also received 
training from those instructors." (6) 
 
According to various reports, an organization calling itself the Islamic Jihad 
Group (IJG) recently claimed responsibility for the attacks. A previously unknown 
group, possibly an offshoot of Islamic Jihad and the Muslim Brotherhood of 
Egypt, the IJG first posted a message (containing spelling and grammatical 
errors) on an anti-Karimov website and has claimed responsibility since on 
various other militant Islamic websites. (7) In an 11 April statement posted on the 
internet, IJG claimed that "the terrorist acts were carried out in protest at the 
pressure exerted on orthodox Muslims by Uzbekistan’s temporal power." (8) The 
validity of their claim is disputed however, and remains under investigation. 
 
While some Islamic leaders in the region have denounced the extremist 
activities, (9) the governments have taken steps to improve cooperation and limit 
the spread of such activities. Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov expressed 
concern for the instability, which the bombings in Uzbekistan could create 
throughout the region, (10) and police recently arrested Khodi Fattoyev, the 
leader of Bay’at, a banned Wahhabist group active in the country. (11) 
Kyrgyzstan increased security along the border with Uzbekistan (12) and the 
prosecutor-generals of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (Qodirov and Rashid 
Tusupbekov, respectively) signed an agreement allowing law enforcement 
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agencies to exchange information and to cooperate more efficiently in 
investigations. (13) 
 
For its own part, Uzbekistan has taken steps to broaden international support for 
its efforts; Karimov expressed interest in closer relations with Russia during a 15-
16 April visit to Moscow. (14) Complaining about the slow response of the anti-
terrorist coalition, Karimov told Russian President Vladimir Putin that "a 
regrouping of terrorists is underway; they regroup faster than the anti-terrorist 
coalition; they change their tactics faster and are quick to find weak spots and 
strike." (15) Putin expressed his support for the Uzbek leader and said that "in 
your struggle against these acts, you can count on Russia’s full and 
unconditional support." (16) 
 
The U.S. has also been supportive of Uzbekistan in its crackdown on terrorism 
and, as one U.S. policy maker described the situation, the issue of democracy is 
secondary: "we need to support Karimov’s efforts to crack down on terrorism, 
then move to democracy." (17) 
 
It continues to be the case that Uzbekistan is taking steps that further curtail 
democracy. On 14 April, the Uzbek Ministry of Justice informed the Open Society 
Institute (OSI) — a New York based organization that in 2003 alone contributed 
over $3.7 million to development projects in Uzbekistan — that it would not be 
allowed to reregister. According to government officials, the work of OSI was 
seen to be directed at undermining the government’s authority and "discrediting" 
policies by distorting "the essence and the content of socio-economic, public and 
political reforms conducted in Uzbekistan." (18) 
 
The difficulty of working with the Karimov administration was seen also in a 
recent decision by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) to curtail its involvement in Uzbekistan due to the unwillingness of the 
government to implement reforms. (19) This announcement comes at a time 
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when the EBRD announced plans to increase investments in the seven most 
impoverished countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, including 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. (20) 
 
Toktasyn Buzubayev, Deputy Secretary-General of the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO), (21) told members that terrorist activities like those in 
Uzbekistan were unlikely to spread throughout the region. (22) But Uzbekistan’s 
steps towards increased authoritarianism also are unlikely to resolve the 
concerns that motivated the attacks in the first place. The willingness to trade 
democratic reform for short term gains against terrorism polarizes the debate 
along Manichean lines and reinforces the militants' efforts to overcome state-
sponsored oppression. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) See NIS Observed, 8 Apr 04 via www.bu.edu/iscip; Official figures put the 
death toll at 47, which includes 33 militants, 10 police officers, and 4 civilians. 
Eurasianet, 14 Apr 04 via www.eurasianet.org; some estimates, however, place 
the number of civilians killed as much higher. 
(2) RFE/RL Central Asia Report, 14 Apr 04 via www.rferl.org.  
(3) According to Uzbek Prosecutor-General Rashid Qodirov, "In connection with 
a check-up for complicity in the terror acts 412 reported delinquents who had 
earlier links with religious-extremist movements have been detained by police." 
ITAR-TASS, 0819 GMT, 9 Apr 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0409 via World News 
Connection. In that same briefing, Qodirov told journalists that 54 suspects had 
been arrested. RFE/RL Central Asia Report, 14 Apr 04 via www.rferl.org. 
(4) Kabar News (Bishkek), 0715 GMT, 6 Apr 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0406 via World 
News Connection; Bakir uulu said, "The HT religious and extremist party has no 
involvement in the terrorist acts in Uzbekistan. I have researched a number of 
criminal cases in connection with active members of the HT in Kyrgyzstan and 
have come to the conclusion that there is no proof of HT’s direct involvement in 
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terrorist activities in them." The Uzbek newspaper Pravda Vostoka criticized 
Bakir uulu for these statements. See Pravda Vostoka (Tashkent), 10 Apr 04; 
FBIS-SOV-2004-0410 via World News Connection. 
(5) ITAR-TASS, 0907 GMT, 9 Apr 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0409 via World News 
Connection. 
(6) RFE/RL Central Asia Report, 14 Apr 04, via www.rferl.org. 
(7) RFE/RL Central Asia Report, 14 Apr 04, via www.rferl.org. 
(8) Nezavisimaya gazeta (Moscow), 19 Apr 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0419 via World 
News Connection. 
(9) See, for example, ITAR-TASS, 1839 GMT, 6 Apr 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0406 
via World News Connection. 
(10) ITAR-TASS, 0825 GMT, 7 Apr 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0407 via World News 
Connection. 
(11) ITAR-TASS, 0856 GMT, 16 Apr 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0416 via World News 
Connection. 
(12) AKIpress (Bishkek), 0535 GMT, 5 Apr 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0405 via World 
News Connection. 
(13) RFE/RL Newsline, 23 Apr 04 via www.rferl.org. 
(14) Eurasianet, 19 Apr 04 via www.eurasianet.org.  
(15) ITAR-TASS, 1531 GMT, 15 Apr 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0415 via World News 
Connection. 
(16) RFE/RL Central Asia Report, 19 Apr 04 via www.rferl.org. 
(17) Eurasianet, 14 Apr 04 via www.eurasianet.org.  
(18) OSI contributes largely to the spheres of education, public health, cultural 
preservation, the arts, and economic reforms. A statement by the organization 
said that "the foundation has equipped most of Uzbekistan’s universities and 
more than 100 secondary schools with computers and internet access [as well as 
administering] close to $1 million annually in U.S. government-funded assistance 
in education, HIV/AIDS prevention, and efforts to reduce the demand for illegal 
drugs." Eurasianet, 18 Apr 04 via www.eurasianet.org.  
(19) RFE/RL Central Asia Report, 14 Apr 04 via www.rferl.org. 
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(20) The four other states targets by EBRD are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
and Moldova. ITAR-TASS, 1601 GMT, 19 Apr 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-04-19 via 
World News Connection. 
(21) The CSTO includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and 
Tajikistan. 
(22) ITAR-TASS, 0833 GMT, 5 Apr 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0405 via World News 
Connection. 
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